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EVIDENCE SEIZED IN FOREIGN SEARCHES: WHEN DOES
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
APPLY?
As travel abroad increases, encounters with foreign governmen-"
tal authorities also increase. Although most encounters are benign,
many occur in criminal settings, yielding evidence that may be
used against American citizens in subsequent prosecutions within
the United States. Consequently, American courts must often de-
termine whether the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution requires the exclusion of evidence seized by foreign
officials.
This Note examines the application of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to evidence seized in foreign searches. The Note
reviews the history of the exclusionary rule and explores the cur-
rent practice of federal courts regarding evidence seized by foreign
officials. The Note then proposes an integral-part test that requires
courts to exclude evidence when domestic officials play an integral
part in a foreign search and seizure. The integral-part test furthers
the purpose of the exclusionary rule by deterring collusion between
American and foreign officials who otherwise might conduct uncon-
stitutional searches of United States citizens.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states
that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.'
In Weeks v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court es-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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tablished the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the introduction of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. In Weeks,
a United States marshall, who did not have a search warrant,
seized various items from the defendant's home.3 The defendant
petitioned the trial court for the return of the seized property,4
and the court ordered the prosecution to return any property that
was not relevant to the issues at trial.' The court admitted into
evidence the retained property, despite the defendant's objections.6
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court, by permitting the
prosecution to retain the property and use it against the defen-
dant, committed prejudicial error because the seizure of the evi-
dence violated the fourth amendment.7
The Exclusionary Rule and its Rationale
Commentators have suggested three theories to support the ex-
clusionary rule:8 personal-right; judicial-integrity; and deterrence.
The personal-right theory states that the fourth amendment re-
quires the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Thus,
if government officials seize evidence from a defendant in violation
of the fourth amendment, the defendant has a constitutional right
3. Id. at 386.
4. Id. at 387-88.
5. Id. at 388.
6. Id. The defendant based his objections on the fourth and fifth amendments.
7. Id. at 398. Weeks was not the first case in which the Supreme Court used the fourth
amendment as a basis for excluding evidence from trial. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of forfeiture against the defendants
because the trial court, over the objections of the defendants, ordered the production of an
invoice that was used against the defendants at trial. Failure by the defendants to produce
the invoice would have resulted in an admission of the prosecution's charges. Id. at 618. The
Supreme Court held that the compulsory production of the invoice and the government's
use of it against the defendants violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 638. Thus,
although the Supreme Court did not announce the exclusionary rule in Boyd, the Court did
lay the foundation for the rule. See generally W. LAFAvE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREA-
TISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDmENT 1-219 (1978); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment:
The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621.
8. See Geller, supra note 7, at 640-56; Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule:
Past, Present, No Future, 12 AM. CanM. L. REv. 507, 508-17 (1975). But see Schlesinger &
Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18
DUQ. L. REv. 225 (1980) (contending that the Supreme Court in Weeks based the exclusion-
ary rule on notions of property, and urging a return to a property-based notion of the exclu-
sionary rule.).
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to have the evidence excluded from trial. The case law offers some
support for this theory. In Weeks, the Supreme Court stated that
"there was involved in the order refusing the [defendant's] appli-
cation [for the return of his property] a denial of the constitutional
rights of the accused. . ."' In Olmstead v. United States,0 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its support for the personal-right the-
ory, declaring that "[t]he striking outcome of the Weeks Case and
those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the
Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use
of evidence in court, really forbade its introduction, if obtained by
government officers through a violation of the amendment." In
Mapp v. Ohio,11 the Court concluded that the "Weeks rule is of
constitutional origin," but the Court reversed itself in Stone v.
Powell,12 stating that "[p]ost-Mapp decisions have established that
the rule is not a personal constitutional right."
The second theory of the exclusionary rule suggests that the rule
preserves judicial integrity."' If the courts admitted evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment, they would appear to be
condoning unconstitutional conduct by government officials. Ad-
mission of such evidence would impair the courts' ability to admin-
ister justice because citizens would perceive that courts were un-
just. Therefore, to promote public confidence in the judicial system
and to preserve the courts' ability to administer justice, courts
must exclude evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. In Weeks, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]o sanction
such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Consti-
tution, intended for the protection of the people against such un-
authorized action. 1 4 In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis expounded the
theoretical and practical reasons that support the judicial-integrity
9. 232 U.S. at 398.
10. 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928).
11. 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
12. 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
13. See generally Henderson, Justice in the Eighties: The Exclusionary Rule and the
Principle of Judicial Integrity, 65 JUDICATURE 354 (1982).
14. 232 U.S. at 394. For arguments that the preservation of judicial integrity was the
original basis of the exclusionary rule, see Henderson, supra note 13, at 354. See also Sun-
derland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 141, 142-43 (1978).
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theory:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Govern-
ment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill,
it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
court should resolutely set its face.15
In Stone, however, the Court downplayed the importance of the
judicial-integrity theory as a justification for the exclusionary
rule.1
6
Deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct supports the third
theory of the exclusionary rule.'7 The deterrence theory posits
that, by excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth
15. 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes further explained how un-
lawful police activity implicated the courts:
For those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken between the Gov-
ernment as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If the existing code does
not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not
permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. The Supreme Court stated that "[a]lthough our decisions often have alluded to the
'imperative of judicial integrity,'.. . they demonstrate the limited role of this justification
in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular context." 428 U.S. at 485
(citations omitted).
17. The Court first mentioned deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct as a possible
rationale for the exclusionary rule in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Holding that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence that was seized by state officials and used in
state prosecutions, the Supreme Court declared:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reli-
ance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally
effective.
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), the Court explicitly adopted the
deterrence theory by declaring that "[t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." The Court did not propose that
deterrence was the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule; it noted that the rule also pre-
served judicial integrity. Id. at 222.
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amendment, courts will discourage the police from engaging in un-
constitutional conduct.18 The Supreme Court currently has
adopted the deterrence theory. In United States v. Janis,19 the
Court announced that its decisions had "established that the
'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future
unlawful police conduct."'
The Exclusionary Rule and Foreign Searches
The exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized by federal offi-
cials 20 or state officials21 during domestic searches. The rule also
applies to evidence seized by domestic officials when they act
against United States citizens abroad.2 2 Conversely, the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to evidence seized by foreign officials be-
cause the United States Constitution does not protect United
States citizens from the actions of foreign officials. 3 Therefore, re-
gardless of the theory underlying the exclusionary rule-personal-
right, judicial-integrity, or deterrence-evidence seized indepen-
dently by foreign officials need not be excluded.24 In fact, the Su-
18. For criticism of the exclusionary rule's effectiveness as a deterrent device, see Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 665 (1970);
Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to Po-
lice?, 62 JUmICATURE 404 (1979); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the
Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STun. 243 (1973). But see Canon, Is the
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations
of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calan-
dra, 69 Nw. U.L. Rv. 740 (1974).
19. 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974)).
20. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away
just because he happens to be in another land." Id. at 6.
23. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965). See also Saltzburg,
The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 741, 746 (1980).
24. The personal-right theory of the exclusionary rule protects a citizen from unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures by those officials sworn to uphold the United States Constitu-
tion. Foreign officials, of course, are not so sworn. The personal-right theory, therefore, is
inapplicable to searches and seizures conducted by foreign officials. The admission of evi-
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preme Court has stated that "[i]t is well established. . that the
exclusionary rule. . is not applicable where. . . a foreign govern-
ment commits the offending act."'25
In determining the admissibility of evidence seized by foreign of-
ficials, the lower federal courts have heeded the Supreme Court's
admonition in United States v. Calandra6 that the exclusionary
rule applies only when the deterrent purpose of the rule is "most
efficaciously served." The courts have concluded that the exclusion
of evidence seized by foreign officials ordinarily would not further
the policy of deterrence.17 The courts reason that the fourth
amendment does not, by its terms, require exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of its provisions. 28 Rather, the exclusionary
rule is a judicially created prophylactic policy designed to deter
unconstitutional conduct by domestic officials. Because American
courts cannot force foreign officials to abide by the United States
Constitution, exclusion of evidence seized by foreign officials would
serve no deterrent purpose.
Federal courts will exclude evidence seized by foreign officials,
however, if domestic officials sufficiently participated in the foreign
search or if foreign officials acted as agents of the United States
government in conducting the search.29 The courts invoke the ex-
dence seized by foreign officials also does not impair judicial integrity because no unconsti-
tutional conduct has occurred. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. Similarly,
because American courts have no authority over foreign officials, a refusal to admit evidence
seized by foreign officials would not deter their activity. See supra notes 18-19 and accom-
panying text.
25. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976).
26. 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
27. See United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 271 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 906 (1976); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). See also Comment, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule
to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained in Foreign Countries, 16 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 495, 496 (1977); Note, The Fourth Amendment Abroad: Civilian and Military Per-
spectives, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 515, 523 (1977).
28. The personal-right theory challenges this premise. See supra text accompanying notes
8-12.
29. See Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Powell, agents of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), in cooperation with Japanese officials, searched
Powell's off-base apartment. Id. at 639. The Japanese search warrant did not comport with
the constitutional requirements of domestic search warrants. Id. at 640. United States offi-
[Vol. 25:161
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clusionary rule under these circumstances because the effect of the
search is the same as if domestic officials had conducted the search
themselves. Consequently, exclusion of the improperly obtained
evidence deters unconstitutional conduct by domestic officials who
act against United States citizens abroad.
Courts also exclude evidence when the circumstances surround-
ing a foreign search shock the judicial conscience 5" The shocking-
conduct rule is founded on the supervisory power of the federal
courts over the administration of justice, a power that arises from
the need to preserve judicial integrity.31 In McNabb v. United
cials used the evidence against Powell, resulting in his discharge from civilian employment
with the Air Force. Id. at 639. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the trial court should have excluded the evidence because "OSI
agents [had] requested the search and actually conducted it." Id. at 640. See also United
States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120,
139 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d
753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972). But see United States v. Mundt,
508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). In Mundt, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that "[tihe test, according to our view,
is not whether American officers have played a substantial role in events leading up to the
arrest." Id. at 907. The court emphasized that the American agent was "merely coordinating
with the foreign officers and was not at that time seeking evidence for use in an American
case." Id. at 906. The court also noted that the investigative efforts of the foreign police led
to an independent prosecution. Id. at 907. Apparently, under the Tenth Circuit's analysis, if
an American official does not intend to use the evidence in future litigation in a United
States court, and if the foreign officials have their own reasons for conducting the search,
the extent of the American official's participation is irrelevant and a court may admit the
evidence. For a discussion of Mundt see Saltzburg, supra note 23, at 762-64. See also Com-
ment, supra note 27 at 507-08.
30. The exclusion of evidence because of the shocking conduct of the officials who seized
it originated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951). In Rochin, the defendant was
convicted for possessing morphine. Id. at 166. Two morphine pills introduced as evidence
were obtained by forcing an emetic solution into the defendant's stomach to induce vomit-
ing. Id. The United States Supreme Court stated that the "proceedings by which this con-
viction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private senti-
mentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience." Id. at 172. See also United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 456 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981);
Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979); United
States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120,
139 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977). See generally Comment, supra note
27, at 514-19.
31. See supra note 30 and cases cited therein. See generally Recent Development, Exclu-
sion of Evidence Under the Supervisory Power 66 CoaNmLL L. Rv. 382 (1981).
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States, 2 the Supreme Court asserted that courts should not be im-
plicated in unlawful conduct by federal officials. Justice Brandeis
expressed a similar sentiment in Olmstead when he stated that the
theory of judicial integrity is a justification for the exclusionary
rule.33 Thus the theory of judicial integrity is a basis for the shock-
ing-conduct rule.
The judicial-integrity justification fails, however, when applied
to foreign searches. Judicial integrity is impaired only when the
courts are implicated in unconstitutional conduct. A foreign official
acting in his own country is incapable of engaging in conduct that
violates the United States Constitution. 4 Therefore, the admission
of evidence independently seized by foreign officials does not im-
pair a court's judicial integrity, regardless of the shocking circum-
stances surrounding the seizure. 5 Because the judicial-integrity
theory does not support application of the shocking-conduct rule
to actions by foreign officials, a court in the United States could
admit evidence obtained by foreign officials without impairing its
integrity.
Another justification for the shocking-conduct rule is that it en-
sures the reliability of evidence. 6 Courts should view with suspi-
cion any evidence obtained under circumstances that shock the
conscience because evidence obtained by coercion or duress is
often unreliable. The reliability rationale is valid when applied to
confessions, but fails when applied to physical evidence.37 If for-
eign officials seize contraband through coercive means, the coercion
32. 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). In McNabb, the police questioned the defendants for two
days without allowing the defendants to see a lawyer. Id.
33. See supra text accompanying note 15.
34. See supra note 24.
35. But see United States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525, 1 M.J. 145 (1975), modified, 24
C.M.A. 156, 1 M.J. 334 (1976). In Jordan, the court observed that "[ilt is American judicial
power that is being exerted against [the defendant] and in such a case, it is by American
constitutional standards that he should be judged." 23 C.M.A. at 527, 1 M.J. at 149. The
court also noted that the defendant's status as a United States serviceman ordered overseas
demanded significant solicitude for his fourth amendment rights. Id. On the government's
petition for reconsideration, the court cited the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule as
the basis for its decision. 24 C.M.A. at 157, 1 M.J. at 336. For a discussion of Jordan, see
Note, supra note 27.
36. Saltzburg, supra note 23, at 765 n.125.
37. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1951), however, the Supreme Court re-
jected the distinction between oral and physical evidence.
[Vol. 25:161
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does not affect the reliability of the evidence. The contraband
speaks for itself. If, on the other hand, foreign officials force a per-
son to admit that he previously possessed contraband, the reliabil-
ity of the statement is suspect. The reliability rationale, therefore,
justifies the shocking-conduct rule only when applied to
confessions.
Courts rarely invoke the shocking-conduct rule to exclude evi-
dence seized by foreign officials because the courts have been un-
willing to find anything less than torture shocking as a matter of
law.3 8 When courts have invoked the shocking-conduct rule,
United States officials usually have participated in the shocking
conduct. 39 Moreover, the shocking-conduct rule has no logical or
constitutional basis when the issue concerns tangible evidence
seized by foreign officials acting independently. 0 Consequently,
when intangible evidence seized by foreign officials is the object of
a suppression motion, courts should determine whether sufficient
participation by domestic officials exists to apply the exclusionary
rule.
38. Compare United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) with United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). The two
cases arose out of a conspiracy to import heroin. In Toscanino, foreign authorities denied
the defendant sleep and food for days at a time. They kicked, beat, and otherwise physically
abused the defendant before returning him to the United States for trial. 500 F.2d at 270.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "a federal court's
criminal process is abused or degraded where it is executed against a defendant who has
been brought into the territory of the United States by the methods alleged here." Id. at
276. The court added that "[w]e could not tolerate such an abuse without debasing 'the
processes of justice."' Id. In Lujan, the defendant merely charged that the "law was vio-
lated" during the process of bringing him into the United States. 510 F.2d at 66. The Sec-
ond Circuit in Lujan declared that "not every violation by prosecution or police is so egre-
gious that Rochin and its progeny requires nullification of the indictment." 510 F.2d at 66.
39. For example, in Toscanino some of the foreign officials were paid agents of the United
States government. 500 F.2d at 269. American officials were aware of the interrogation, re-
ceived progress reports and, at one point, participated in the interrogation. Id. at 270.
40. See Saltzburg, supra note 23, at 775. Saltzburg suggests that the courts could exclude
eviddnce that police procured in violation of "fundamental international norms of decency."
Id. Exclusion would demonstrate that "no civilized nation should countenance violatiois of
fundamental human rights." Id. The role of the courts in the United States, however, is not
to enforce fundamental international norms of decency. The courts should interpret and
apply domestic law. If exclusion has no basis in the applicable law, then the courts should
not exclude relevant evidence.
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THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Because the United States Supreme Court has not decided when
a domestic official's participation in a foreign search is sufficient to
invoke the exclusionary rule, lower courts have had to reason by
analogy. Some courts have relied on earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions involving the participation of federal officials in state
searches.41 Prior to Wolf v. Colorado,42 the Court had not applied
the fourth amendment to searches conducted by state, rather than
federal, officials. When the Supreme Court announced the exclu-
sionary rule in Weeks v. United States,43 the Court limited appli-
cation of the rule to searches conducted by federal officials. This
limitation encouraged federal officials to seek the aid of state offi-
cials in conducting searches and seizing evidence, thereby sub-
verting the exclusionary rule. Participation by federal officials
transformed a state search into a federal undertaking, however,
thus violating the fourth amendment.
Searches conducted by foreign officials are analogous to pre-Wolf
searches conducted by state officials because foreign officials are
not subject to the fourth amendment.44 Consequently, some courts
have applied the analysis developed in the pre-Wolf cases to
searches conducted by foreign officials.
In Byars v. United States,45 the Supreme Court invoked the ex-
clusionary rule to exclude evidence seized by state officials. In By-
ars, local police officials requested that a federal agent participate
in a search of the defendant's home.46 The federal agent searched
41. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text.
42. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
bound the states as well as the federal government. The Court did not extend the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence seized by state officials and used in state prosecutions, however. The
Court declared that freedom from arbitrary intrusions by the police was a basic right in a
free society, but added that "the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a
different 6rder." Id. at 28. The court observed that the exclusionary rule was only one
method of enforcing the fourth amendment, and that the states might find other methods.
Id. at 31.
43. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
44. But see Saltzburg, supra note 23, at 769. Saltzburg argues that the utility of this
analogy is limited because the pre-Wolf position of state governments and the contemporary
status of foreign governments are not analogous.
45. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
46. Id. at 30.
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the house with the police, seized some evidence, and received addi-
tional evidence seized by the local police.47 Although the state
search warrant was defective by fourth amendment standards, the
federal district judge admitted the evidence and found the defen-
dant guilty of violating federal prohibition laws.48
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "the search in sub-
stance and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal of-
ficers. 1 9 Because the search was a joint operation, "the effect
[was] the same as though [the federal agent] had engaged in the
undertaking as one exclusively his own."50 Even though the search
was ostensibly conducted by state officials, the federal agent's par-
ticipation justified application of the exclusionary rule. The Court
added, however, that it did not "question the right of the federal
government to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state
officers operating entirely on their own account." 51 Thus, if the lo-
cal police had conducted the search for their own reasons and had
given the evidence to federal officials to use in a federal prosecu-
tion, the Court would not have excluded the evidence.
Shortly after Byars, the Court again considered the applicability
of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized by state officials. In
Gambino v. United States,52 two New York state troopers arrested
the defendants and, without a warrant, seized liquor from the de-
fendants' vehicle. The state troopers delivered the liquor to federal
officials, who prosecuted the defendants for violating the National
Prohibition Act.53 Even though no federal officer participated in
the search of the defendants' vehicle, the Supreme Court reversed
the convictions. 4
The Court noted that the state troopers had not acted at the
direction of federal officers, and that federal officials had not at-
tempted to circumvent the exclusionary rule.5 In holding that the
47. Id. at 31.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 33.
50. Id.
51. Id. This is basically a statement of the silver platter doctrine. See infra note 68 and
accompanying text.
52. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id. at 319.
55. Id. at 316.
1983]
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trial court should have excluded the evidence, however, the Court
took judicial notice "that the state troopers believed that they
were required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition
Act, and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in per-
formance of that supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding in
the federal prosecution." 56 Admission of the evidence in the federal
prosecution violated the defendants' fourth amendment rights be-
cause "[t]he wrongful arrest, search and seizure were made solely
on behalf of the United States. ' 57 Thus, the trial court should have
excluded the evidence because the state troopers seized the evi-
dence while acting as agents of the federal government.
The development of the law pertaining to federal participation
in searches conducted by state officials culminated in Lustig v.
United States.55 In Lustig, a Secret Service agent informed local
police that he believed the defendants were engaged in suspicious
activity in their hotel room. The local police searched the room for
evidence of violations of local law.5 9 The local police foupad evi-
dence of counterfeiting, the activity that the federal agent had sus-
pected. The federal agent went to the hotel room and inspected
the evidence.60 The local police gave all of the seized items to the
federal agent, and federal authorities used the evidence to convict
the defendants. 1 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
convictions.2
The Court recognized that the federal agent did not request or
instigate the search, and that the local police did not undertake
the search to enforce federal law.6 3 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the trial court should have excluded the evidence because a
"search is a functional, not merely a physical, process."64 The
Court reasoned that the search was a federal search subject to the
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id. at 316.
58. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
59. Id. at 76. Local law required "known criminals" to register with local police within 24
hours of arriving in the jurisdiction. Id.
60. The secret service agent had waited at police headquarters during the search because
he "was curious to see what [the police] would find." Id. at 77.
61. Id. at 75.
62. Id. at 80.
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id.
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prohibitions of the fourth amendment because the federal agent's
participation could not be severed from the rest of the search.6
Under the Court's analysis, whether the federal agent originated
the search or joined in later was immaterial. As long as he joined
the search before the accomplishment of the search's purpose, the
Court would find that he had participated.6
Reaffirming the principle developed in Byars, the Supreme
Court declared in Lustig that "[t]he crux of [the Byars] doctrine is
that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it;
it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state
authorities is turned over to federal officials on a silver platter."67
In Lustig, the federal authorities could have used the evidence of
counterfeiting if the local police had searched the defendants' hotel
room without the federal agent's participation. Consequently, after
Lustig federal authorities were free to use evidence seized by state
authorities and gratuitously turned over to federal officials on a
"silver platter."68
In Byars, Gambino, and Lustig, the Supreme Court delineated
the circumstances under which evidence seized by state officials
would be subject to the exclusionary rule. If federal officials partic-
ipated in a state search or if state officials acted as agents of the
federal government when conducting a search, federal courts would
exclude the evidence. These are the precise circumstances under
which the federal courts now exclude evidence seized by foreign
officials. The courts have adopted the silver platter doctrine, either
explicitly69 or implicitly,70 because foreign officials are not subject
65. Id.
66. Id. at 79. The Court continued: "fthe decisive factor in determining the applicability
of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of
securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means." Id.
67. Id. at 78-79.
68. The Supreme Court later rejected the silver platter doctrine in the federal-state con-
text in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), which had made the fourth amendment applicable to the states. The silver platter
doctrine was based on the theory that a jurisdiction not subject to the fourth amendment
could violate constitutional standards and voluntarily provide admissible evidence to a juris-
diction subject to the fourth amendment. Thus, the Court reasoned that Wolf removed the
underpinning of the silver platter doctrine. The silver platter doctrine is still applicable in
the context of foreign searches, however, because foreign officials are not subject to the
fourth amendment.
69. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-46 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 960 (1969).
70. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956
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to the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Like state officials prior to Elkins v. United
States, 71 foreign officials can violate constitutional standards and
provide domestic officials with evidence that will be admissible
against the defendant in a domestic prosecution. 2 Therefore, the
silver platter doctrine remains a viable method for determining the
admissibility of evidence seized by foreign officials.
THE INTERNATIONAL SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Federal courts are reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule to ev-
idence seized by foreign officials73 because exclusion rarely serves
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter un-
constitutional conduct by domestic officials. Consequently, without
a significant degree of participation by domestic agents in a foreign
search, courts in the United States will not exclude evidence seized
by foreign officials.7 4 By requiring significant participation by do-
mestic officials, the courts assure that the exclusion of evidence
will deter unconstitutional conduct. The courts, however, have
overlooked vital principles underlying the silver platter doctrine.
Moreover, by requiring significant participation by domestic offi-
cials in foreign searches, the courts have failed to protect American
(1977). The Fifth Circuit in Morrow did not refer explicitly to any of the pre-Wolf silver
platter cases. The court noted, however, that evidence seized by foreign officials would be
excluded by courts in the United States if United States agents had participated in the
foreign search, or if foreign officials acted as agents of the United States government in
seizing the evidence. Id. at 139.
71. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See supra note 68.
72. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
74. See Marzano v. United States, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977) (FBI agents requested that the Grand Cayman Island police conduct a search
for the defendants, were present when the police searched the defendants, and helped cata-
logue the items seized); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 949 (1975) (DEA agent helped Peruvian agents plan a search and seizure, moni-
tored the room where the drug transaction occurred, and field-tested the drugs seized from
the defendant); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 960 (1969) (IRS agent in the Philippines helped plan a search of the defendants' busi-
ness, was present during the police search, indicated additional areas to be searched, and
inspected documents seized on the premises). See generally Comment, supra note 27, at
502-10.
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citizens from attempts by domestic officials to circumvent the
fourth amendment.
Stonehill v. United States
The leading case on the international silver platter doctrine,
Stonehill v. United States,7 5 exemplifies the weaknesses of the ju-
dicial analysis used to decide whether to exclude evidence seized
by foreign officials. In Stonehill, a former employee of the defen-
dants provided information to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
representative stationed abroad. The information indicated that
the defendants might be liable for back taxes.7 6 The IRS agent re-
ferred the employee to Philippine officials who were conducting an
investigation of the defendants.7 Subsequently, the Philippine au-
thorities decided to search the business premises of the
defendants. 8
Some of the preparations for the search occurred in the IRS
agent's home, and he suggested including an additional building in
the search.7 9 During the search, IRS agents complied with a re-
quest by Philippine officials for assistance in the selection of signif-
icant records °0 They also directed the Philippine authorities to a
storage room that had been overlooked."' The Philippine officials
gave some of the seized records to the IRS agents, and a tax fraud
investigation ensued.8 2
The United States government used the records to establish tax
assessments against the defendants.83 At trial, the defendants un-
successfully sought to suppress the evidence seized by the Philip-
pine authorities. The defendants argued that the court should ex-
clude the evidence because United States officials had participated
in a search that would have violated the fourth amendment if con-
75. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
76. Id. at 740.
77. Id. at 741.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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ducted in the United States.84 The trial court denied the defen-
dants' motion to suppress the evidence, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 5
The Ninth Circuit noted that evidence seized by foreign officials
in a foreign jurisdiction generally was not subject to the exclusion-
ary rule."' The court then defined the degree of participation by
domestic agents in a foreign search required to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule: a court should exclude evidence seized by foreign offi-
cials only if participation by domestic agents was so substantial
that the search was a "joint venture" between the domestic agents
and the foreign officials. 87 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
IRS agents' participation in the unlawful search was insufficient to
make the search a joint venture. 88
In adopting the joint venture standard in Stonehill, the Ninth
Circuit relied on Byars, Gambino, and Lustig. Although the court
drew the "joint venture" language from Byars,8 the court misin-
terpreted Byars and its progeny. The dissent in Stonehill noted
that the Supreme Court in Byars did not establish a joint venture
standard for determining whether to exclude evidence seized in a
state search; "joint venture" was merely the Supreme Court's
description of what had transpired.90
Even more significant than the court's misreading of Byars was
its disregard of the principles enunciated in Lustig.91 Lustig should
have been controlling in Stonehill because the status of foreign
84. Id. at 740. The Philippine search warrant was defective because it failed to allege a
specific offense. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]f the raids had been conducted by United
States agents, they would have been illegal under our Constitution." Id. at 743.
85. Id. at 740.
86. Id. at 743. For a discussion of the rationale underlying this general rule, see supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
87. 405 F.2d at 743. An economic joint venture arises when two or more parties agree to
undertake a particular enterprise and to dissolve the relationship after completing the pro-
ject. See, e.g., H. HENN, CORPORATIONs 77-78 (2d ed. 1970).
88. 405 F.2d at 746. The elements of an economic joint venture are an express or implied
agreement, a joint interest, the sharing of profits, and the mutual right to control. See, e.g.,
H. HENN, supra note 87, at 78.
89. 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
90. 405 F.2d at 748 (Browning, J., dissenting). The dissent added that "[i]f this was not
clear in Byars itself, the Supreme Court made it so in Lustig." Id. See also Comment, supra
note 27, at 503.
91. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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governments is analogous to the pre-Wolf status of state govern-
ments in the context of fourth amendment analysis.92 Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit should have examined the participation
of federal officials in the Philippine search by the standards estab-
lished in Lustig, rather than by the joint venture standard.9 3
The Ninth Circuit in Stonehill failed to apply the standards es-
tablished in Lustig for several reasons. The court concluded that
Philippine officials had planned and instigated the search before
the IRS agents became involved. 4 This conclusion was mconsis-
tent with the court's finding that some of the preparations for the
search occurred at an IRS agent's home and that the agent sug-
gested searching an additional building.9 The absence of federal
involvement in the preliminary stages of a search is also immate-
rial; domestic officials need not instigate or plan a foreign search to
invoke the exclusionary rule. In Lustig, the Supreme Court stated
that federal instigation of a state search was not a prerequisite for
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized by state offi-
cials during a search. A similar standard should apply when
courts analyze the participation of domestic officials in a foreign
search.
The court also found that the activities of the IRS agents oc-
curred either before or after the search. 97 This conclusion was in-
consistent with the court's findings that agents visited the prem-
ises during the search, selected significant documents for the
Philippine officials to seize, and directed them to a storage area
that they had overlooked.98 The court's conclusion that the IRS
agents had not participated in the search, even if correct, would
not determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule. In Lustig,
the Supreme Court held that a search was a functional, as well as a
physical, process. A "[s]earch is not completed until effective ap-
92. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Mundt, 508
F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974) (describing the joint venture test as indefinite, vague, and
unreliable), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
94. 405 F.2d at 746.
95. Id. at 741.
96. 338 U.S. at 79.
97. 405 F.2d at 746.
98. Id. at 742.
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propriation, as part of an uninterrupted transaction, is made of il-
licitly obtained objects for subsequent proof of an offense."' 9 A
court must view a search in its entirety If a domestic official has
participated in the "effective appropriation" of the evidence, he
has participated in the search. Thus, even if the IRS agents in
Stonehill did not participate in the actual physical process of the
seizure, he participated functionally in the search because his in-
put led to the seizure of the evidence.
Finally, the court concluded that the IRS agents had not re-
quested any action or instigated the search by making the informa-
tion from the defendants' former employee available to the Philip-
pine authorities. 100 In Lustig, however, the Supreme Court stated
that "[it was] immaterial whether a federal agent originated the
idea or joined in it while the search was in progress." 10 1 Thus, even
if the IRS agents in Stonehill did not instigate the search of the
defendants' premises, they participated because they joined the
search while it was in progress.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Stonehill implied that a court
should not exclude evidence seized in a foreign search if the do-
mestic agent did not jointly control the actual search. The Ninth
Circuit's analysis, however, ignored the fundamental principle of
Lustig that a search is also a functional process. As the dissent in
Stonehill stated, "The enterprise must be viewed as a functional
whole."102 Consequently, although the IRS agents did not partici-
pate in all phases of the search and seizure, they contributed to the
appropriation of the evidence, and the court should have excluded
the evidence.
United States v. Marzano
In United States v. Marzano,10 3 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit also had to decide whether to exclude
evidence seized by foreign officials. Marzano involved the theft of
99. 338 U.S. at 78.
100. 405 F.2d at 746.
101. 338 U.S. at 79.
102. 405 F.2d at 751 (Browning, J., dissenting).
103. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
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more than $3,000,000 from an armored car company.104 The Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) traced the defendants to Grand
Cayman Island. 0 5 Two FBI agents met with Grand Cayman Island
police officials and informed them that the FBI was seeking the
defendants.""6 The Island police searched for the defendants, ar-
rested them for violating a local law, 0 7 and seized money and other
items from them.108 Grand Cayman officials then returned the de-
fendants to the United States. 09 At trial, the defendants moved to
suppress the evidence seized by the Island police on the grounds
that the FBI agents had participated in an unconstitutional search
and seizure on Grand Cayman Island. 0 The trial judge denied the
motion to suppress the evidence because the FBI agents "through-
out the time in question were mere observers.""' The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's ruling." 2
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the defendants' assertion that
the Island police would not have arrested the defendants without
the information provided by the FBI."' The court concluded, how-
ever, that "the law is clear that providing information to a foreign
functionary is not sufficient involvement for the Government to be
considered a participant in acts the foreign functionary takes
based on that information.""14 The Seventh Circuit did not pro-
pose a standard for determining the degree of involvement by do-
mestic officials that would make the officials participants in a for-
eign search. The court simply concluded that "the involvement of
the Government agents in this case was too insignificant for them
to be considered participants in the actions of the foreign police
104. Id. at 261.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 270.
107. Id. The Island police arrested the defendants for refusing to give their names to the
local police upon request. Id. at 277 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 269.
109. Id.
110. The defendants alleged that the Island police lacked probable cause. 388 F. Supp.
906, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The Seventh Circuit assumed, for purposes of its decision, that the
Island police and the FBI lacked probable cause. 537 F.2d at 269.
111. 388 F. Supp. at 908.
112. 537 F.2d at 276.
113. Id. at 270.
114. Id.
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official."" 5 The court based its decision on the deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule.116 Because the FBI agents had not partici-
pated in the search, excluding the evidence would not deter uncon-
stitutional conduct.
The result in Marzano appears defensible. Crime is often inter-
national in scope, and law enforcement officials must share infor-
mation. Excluding evidence from a domestic prosecution solely be-
cause domestic officials provided foreign officials with information
that eventually led to a seizure of evidence would serve little pur-
pose and could cripple international efforts to combat crime.1 7
Marzano, however, was more than a simple case of providing infor-
mation that led to the seizure of evidence. When the FBI agents
arrived on Grand Cayman Island, they had no warrants for the ar-
rests of the defendants." 8 The FBI agents gave the Island police
photographs of the defendants, and explicitly requested the police
to find the defendants." 9 The ensuing search for the defendants
culminated in their arrest in the presence of an FBI agent. 120 Sub-
sequently, the FBI agents inspected and helped inventory the
items seized from the defendants.' 21
Even if the FBI agents' participation in the physical search and
seizure was too insignificant to justify exclusion of the evidence,
Lustig requires a court to look beyond the physical search process,
115. Id.
116. Id. at 271.
117. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956
(1977). In Morrow, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute stolen and
counterfeited securities. Id. at 125. The FBI had informed Canadian police officials that an
American who was living in Toronto had information about stolen securities. Id. at 139. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court properly ad-
mitted the evidence that Canadian officials had seized in a search undertaken on the basis
of information provided by the American citizen. Id. at 141. The court saw
no possible way in which the goal of deterring unlawful conduct by American
law enforcement officials can be served by excluding the evidence in question
for the simple reason that there was no unlawful or unreasonable conduct 6n
the part of the FBI. ...
Id. at 140. See also United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
118. 537 F.2d at 276 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 277.
121. Id.
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and consider the search as a functional whole. 122 In Lustig, the Su-
preme Court noted that "[t]he decisive factor in determining the
applicability of the [exclusionary rule] is the actuality of a share by
a federal official in the total enterprise ... . In Marzano, the
Grand Cayman police would not have arrested the defendants
without the FBI agents' request for assistance.124 Thus, the FBI
agents shared in a search that would not have occurred without
their actions. The FBI agents did not provide information that
merely led the local police to seize the evidence; the FBI instigated
the search for the defendants on Grand Cayman Island, and local
police officials conducted the search and seizure on behalf of the
FBI agents. 25 The Island police, therefore, acted as agents of the
United States when they arrested and searched the defendants.
In Marzano, the Seventh Circuit allowed domestic officials to
circumvent the exclusionary rule.12 The court sanctioned the FBI
agents' enlistment of foreign officials in conducting what was es-
sentially a domestic investigation.1 27 By accepting the govern-
ment's argument that the exclusionary rule did not apply because
the FBI agents had not seized the evidence themselves, the court
misapplied the silver platter doctrine. Proper application of the
doctrine requires the exclusion of evidence seized by foreign au-
thorities if domestic officials have participated in the foreign
search or if foreign officials have acted as agents of domestic offi-
cials. The foreign officials must give the evidence to domestic offi-
cials on a silver platter to avoid exclusion. The decision in Mar-
zano undermines the deterrent policy underlying the silver platter
doctrine.
122. 338 U.S. at 78.
123. Id. at 79.
124. See supra text accompanying note 113.
125. Cf. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (requiring exclusion of evidence
when state officials seized evidence on behalf of federal officials).
126. In Marzano, the FBI officials might not have intended to circumvent the exclusion-
ary rule, but the decision increased the probabililty of future intentional evasion and
collusion.
127. The Island police did not investigate the defendants before speaking to the FBI
agents. Moreover, the Island police never formally charged the defendants for refusing to
give their names. 537 F.2d at 276, 277 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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DOMESTIC PARTICIPATION IN A FOREIGN SEARCH: A PROPOSED
STANDARD
Stonehill and Marzano demonstrate the shortcomings of the
analysis that the courts currently employ to determine the admis-
sibility of evidence seized by foreign officials. Both cases ignore
major principles enunciated in Lustig, Gambino, and Byars. Con-
sequently, both cases undermine the original purpose of the silver
platter doctrine, which was to prevent federal officials from cir-
cumventing the fourth amendment.
In Stonehill and Marzano, the courts established a high thresh-
old for applying the exclusionary rule due to the involvement of
domestic officials in foreign searches. The rationale for this high
threshold is that the exclusion of evidence interferes substantially
with the fact-finding process. 28 To justify such interference, a
court must be certain that exclusion of the evidence will deter un-
constitutional conduct by domestic officials. 29 Because the exclu-
sionary rule achieves its deterrent purpose only if domestic agents
actually have participated in the search, a stringent test for finding
actual participation in a foreign search should be used to avoid the
unnecessary exclusion of relevant evidence.
Courts should apply the exclusionary rule to further its deter-
rent purpose. If courts purport to apply the silver platter doctrine
as the Seventh Circuit did in Marzano, however, they should en-
force the primary requirement that there be no involvement by do-
mestic officials in the seizure of evidence obtained by foreign offi-
cials. Courts should admit only evidence that foreign officials
deliver to domestic officials gratuitously. If domestic officials par-
ticipate in the instigation, planning, or execution of a foreign
search, the courts should exclude the evidence to discourage at-
tempts by federal officials to circumvent the exclusionary rule. The
decisions in Stonehill and Marzano encourage domestic officials to
participate in the functional aspects of foreign searches, and to
seek the protection of the silver platter doctrine when defendants
move to suppress the evidence. The fourth amendment should pro-
128. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
129. "The inquiry must focus on what the federal officers did, since only they are subject
to the Fourth Amendment." Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 749 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
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tect United States citizens abroad from involvement by domestic
officials in both the physical and functional aspects of foreign
searches.
The Supreme Court did not intend for the silver platter doctrine
to limit the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Rather, the doc-
trine developed to protect citizens. The Supreme Court devised the
silver platter doctrine at a time when state officials were not sub-
ject to the fourth amendment. The Court sought to prevent federal
officials from circumventing the exclusionary rule by using state
officials to obtain evidence for a federal prosecution. Indirect viola-
tions of an individual's fourth amendment rights worried the Court
as much as direct violations. The Court in Byars declared that
the court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with
an eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Consti-
tution by circuitous and indirect methods. Constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property are to be liberally
construed, and "it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon." Is
In the foreign-search cases, however, the courts have adapted the
silver platter doctrine to serve an entirely different purpose. The
courts have viewed the silver platter doctrine as a manifestation of
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, rather than as a
protection of personal rights. Although deterring unconstitutional
police conduct is an essential goal, using the silver platter doctrine
solely as a deterrent ignores the doctrine's original purpose and its
original rationale-the protection of personal rights.
If the sole purpose of the silver platter doctrine is to deter un-
constitutional police conduct, courts should use a lenient standard
to determine when a federal official's participation in a foreign
search justifies invoking the exclusionary rule. The courts should
resolve any doubts about a domestic official's participation in a
foreign search by admitting the evidence. Such a resolution will
130. 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). The
Court stated that the fourth amendment was "not to be impaired by judicial sanction of
equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of ille-
gality but which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right." 273 U.S. at
33-34.
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avoid the exclusion of relevant evidence, a policy hindered by the
exclusionary rule, but may encourage domestic officials to under-
mine the protections of the fourth amendment. Conversely, if the
purpose of the silver platter doctrine is to protect personal rights,
then even minimal participation by domestic officials in a foreign
search would violate the exclusionary rule. A court should resolve
doubts by excluding the evidence.
The silver platter doctrine can serve both purposes-deterrence
of unconstitutional conduct by domestic officials and protection of
fourth amendment rights-if the courts give meaning to the term
"participation." In Stonehill, the Ninth Circuit enunciated the
joint venture standard for judging whether domestic participation
in a foreign search was sufficient to invoke the exclusionary rule.
Although the adoption of some standard is an essential step, the
joint venture standard fails to protect citizens from officials who
circumvent the fourth amendment.""1 Other courts have concluded
that participation by domestic agents in foreign searches was in-
sufficient to warrant exclusion of the evidence without articulating
any standard.3 2 A standard for determining when the participa-
tion of domestic officials in foreign searches violates the exclusion-
131. In Stonehill, the court acknowledged the possibility that domestic agents might at-
tempt to circumvent the fourth amendment by enlisting the aid of foreign officials in con-
ducting a search. 405 F.2d at 742-46. The court concluded, however, that there was "no
evidence that any United States agents were attempting to shortcircuit the Fourth Amend-
ment rights" of the defendants. 405 F.2d at 746. The joint-venture standard does not pre-
vent attempts to "shortcircuit" the fourth amendment; in fact, it encourages such attempts.
132. E.g., United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[W]e have no
occasion to choose between the joint venture test of Stonehill or the apparently more re-
laxed test of Birdsell. Under either test, the minimal participation of American law enforce-
ment officials is insufficient to invoke the protections of the fourth amendment."),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir.
1976) ("We need not adopt the Ninth Circuit's standard at this time but only need to hold
that the involvement of the Government agents in this case was too insignificant for them to
be considered participants in the actions of the foreign police official."), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 907 (10th Cir. 1974) ("The test,
according to our view, is not whether American officials played a substantial role in events
leading up to the arrest. Nor is the test a question of joint venture. The trial court
found that [the American agent] merely cooperated with the Peruvian Police and this find-
ing is supported by the evidence."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); United States v. Cal-
laway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971) (The fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not
apply because "the challenged searches occurred in a foreign country, [and] were conducted
by law enforcement officials who were not acting in connection or cooperation with domestic
law enforcement authorities. "), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972).
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ary rule is necessary. Such a standard would provide a principled
basis for analyzing individual cases and would guide domestic offi-
cials in their conduct abroad. s33 In Lustig v. United States,134 the
Supreme Court declared that "a search is a search by a federal
official if he had a hand in it." Judge Browning, dissenting in
Stonehill, articulated the meaning of that language when he con-
cluded that the acts of the IRS agents "were clearly an integral
part of the 'effective appropriation' of the illicitly seized
evidence."' 3 5
Judge Browning's statement in Stonehill provides a more worka-
ble standard than any present standard for determining when to
exclude evidence seized in a foreign search. If domestic agents
played an integral part in a foreign search that does not comply
with the fourth amendment, a court should exclude the evidence.
That is, if the actions of domestic agents were essential to the com-
pleteness of the foreign search,'36 and the search would not meet
constitutional standards if conducted in the United States, then
the court should exclude the evidence. The integral-part test gives
meaning to the silver platter doctrine by protecting citizens from
"stealthy encroachments" upon their fourth amendment rights.
For example, in -Marzano the FBI agents' actions were an integral
part of the foreign search because the FBI instigated the search. 37
Under the circumstances in Marzano, the integral-part test would
133. The need for a standard increases as the incidence of international crime increases.
Crime involving Americans abroad has increased dramatically because of the international
drug trade. Drug smuggling prosecutions often require courts to rule on the admissibility of
evidence seized by foreign officials. See United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981);
Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1979); Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 986 (1967).
134. 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
135. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 728, 751 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
136. Webster's Dictionary defines integral as "essential to completeness." WEStaR's
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1173 (P. Gove ed. 1969).
137. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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require exclusion of the evidence seized by the foreign officials,
thereby foreclosing attempts by domestic officials to circumvent
the fourth amendment.
The integral-part test also advances the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule. Under the integral-part test, courts will exclude
evidence only if domestic officials play a role that is essential to
the completeness of the search. When the participation of domestic
agents is essential to the completeness of a foreign search, their
participation justifies excluding evidence in light of the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule.
The integral-part test is superior to the joint venture standard
because the integral-part test does not require that domestic
agents have joint control of a foreign search to violate the exclu-
sionary rule. For example, although the IRS agents in Stonehill
were not involved in all phases of the search and seizure, they
played an integral part in the seizure of the evidence by suggesting
that a certain building be searched, selecting significant documents
for the Philippine officials to seize, and directing the officials to a
storage room that the officials had overlooked." 8 The IRS agents'
contribution to the seizure of the evidence was essential to the
completeness of the search. The IRS agent's actions changed the
nature of the search, prompting the Philippine authorities to seize
evidence that they otherwise would not have seized.
Finally, the integral-part test does not preclude cooperative in-
ternational efforts to combat crime. The test only prevents cooper-
ation that circumvents the protections of the fourth amendment.
Merely sharing information with foreign officials would not consti-
tute an integral part in a search subsequently conducted by foreign
officials on the basis of the information. The integral-part test,
however, would require the exclusion of evidence if more signifi-
cant conduct by American agents accompanies the transmission of
the information. For instance, if domestic agents share information
with foreign officials and also ask the foreign officials to act on the
information in a specific manner, as they did in Marzano, the inte-
gral-part test would require exclusion of the evidence seized by the
foreign officials. If domestic agents share information with foreign
officials and also join in a search conducted on the basis of the
138. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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information, as they did in Stonehill, the integral-part test also
would require exclusion of the evidence. Therefore, the integral-
part test protects citizens from government efforts to circumvent
the fourth amendment, and serves the deterrent purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule without hampering international efforts to combat
crime.
CONCLUSION
The current 'practice of not applying the exclusionary rule to evi-
dence seized by foreign officials acting independently is sound. The
federal circuit courts have recognized two exceptions to the general
rule. First, the courts will exclude evidence if domestic officials
participated in the foreign search or if foreign officials acted as
agents of the United States government. Second, the courts also
will exclude evidence if the circumstances of the foreign search
shock the judicial conscience. Courts should apply the integral-part
test to either exception to determine whether the participation of
domestic officials in foreign searches requires exclusion of the
evidence.
Involvement by domestic officials in any stage of a foreign
search-mitiation, planning, or execution-should trigger a close
examination of the facts to determine whether the participation by
domestic officials was essential to the completeness of the search.
The integral-part test provides the most satisfactory approach be-
cause it serves the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule while
protecting citizens from attempts to circumvent the fourth
amendment.
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